On January 1, 1999, the Euro was launched and the Eurosystem (the ECB and 11 national central banks in Europe) took responsibility for monetary policy in the Euro area. This paper is a brief evaluation of the Eurosystem's monetary-policy regime after its …rst year, in particular of the extent to which it is similar to in ‡ation targeting as practiced by an increasing number of central banks.
1 I examine three elements of the Eurosystem, namely the goals, the framework for monetary-policy decisions and the communication with outsiders. Criteria for evaluation are whether the goals are unambiguous and appropriate; whether the decision framework is e¢cient in collecting and processing information and reaching decisions that are appropriate relative to the goals; and whether the communication is e¤ective in motivating decisions, simplifying external evaluation and thereby improving transparency and accountability. I also consider whether the actual instrument setting has been appropriate, given the information available at the times of decision.
During the 1990s an increasing number of central banks have adopted in ‡ation targeting, which due to its logical and transparent design and apparent success so far has become a focus of interest and a natural frame of reference. In ‡ation targeting is characterized by, …rst, an explicit numerical in ‡ation target. The in ‡ation target is pursued in the medium run, with due concern for avoiding real instability, for instance, in the output-gap; that is, in ‡ation targeting is " ‡exible" rather than "strict." Second, due to the unavoidable lags in the e¤ects of instruments on in ‡ation, the decision framework is in practice "in ‡ation-forecast targeting" (see below). Third, communication is very explicit and to the point; policy decisions are consistently motivated with reference to published in ‡ation and output(-gap) forecasts. Indeed, in ‡ation targeting has introduced unprecedented transparency and accountability in monetary policy. Three central banks-the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of England, and Sweden's Sveriges Riksbankstand out as particularly consistent and transparent in their implementation of in ‡ation targeting.
I. Goals
The Maastricht Treaty assigns price stability as the primary objective for the Eurosystem but leaves to the Eurosystem the formulation of an operational de…nition. In
October 1998 the Eurosystem de…ned price stability as "as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices for the euro area of below 2%" (ECB 1998a). It has several times emphasized the medium-term orientation of its policy and that a gradualist and measured response to threats to price stability will not introduce "unnecessary and possibly self-sustaining uncertainty into short-term interest rates or the real economy..." (ECB 1999) . This emphasis on the medium term, gradualism, and stability of the real economy is consistent with " ‡exible" rather than "strict" in ‡ation targeting.
However, as commentators quickly pointed out, the Eurosystem's de…nition of price stability was ambiguous, since it did not specify a lower bound for in ‡ation. In November 1998 the ECB president, Willem Duisenberg (1998a) , clari…ed that the word "increase"
should be interpreted as excluding de ‡ation. It would seem to follow that the lower bound was zero and that the de…nition refers to an in ‡ation rate between 0 and 2%. However, two days later, Duisenberg (1998b) stated that "[w]e did not announce a ‡oor for in ‡ation, because we know that the price index may include a measurement bias, but we do not know its magnitude".
If the lower bound is zero, it would seem logical to use the midpoint, 1%, as the point in ‡ation target in the calculation of the M3 reference value. However, when the reference value was announced in December 1998 (ECB 1998b), it appeared that a point in ‡ation target of 1.5% had been used instead.
To this date (January 2000), so far as I know, the Eurosystem has not yet been explicit about the lower bound. If this omission were due to uncertainty about possible measurement bias, it would seem that this would a¤ect both the lower and upper bound to the same extent; otherwise, the width of the range becomes dependent on the measurement bias. It is di¢cult to see any bene…t from such ambiguity. An unambiguous symmetric de…nition (for instance, "above 0 and below 2%") seems preferable, especially since de ‡ation may be as serious a threat these days as in ‡ation.
2

II. Decision Framework
Although in ‡ation targeting is technically di¢cult in practice, the principles of in ‡a-tion targeting are relatively straightforward. Given that monetary policy actions a¤ect in‡ation with a lag, e¢cient in ‡ation targeting requires in ‡ation-forecast targeting (see, for instance, Lars Svensson (1997) and (1999a) and Svensson and Michael Woodford (1999) ).
That is, the central bank needs to make conditional in ‡ation forecasts (conditional on its view of the transmission mechanism, the current state of the economy, and a given planned path for its instrument rate). The bank then selects the instrument plan that results in an "optimal" in ‡ation forecast, that is, an in ‡ation forecast that approaches the in ‡ation target at an appropriate pace without causing too much variability in the real economy or interest rates. The bank then starts implementing the instrument plan, by setting the interest rate accordingly. At regular intervals, if new signi…cant information has been collected, the procedure is repeated and a new interest rate plan adopted and implemented. From this perspective, in ‡ation-forecast targeting is just an algorithm to solve an intertemporal optimization problem. With minor di¤erences, this is the decision framework used by all in ‡ation-targeting central banks.
3 Thus, if the Eurosystem wants to meet its de…nition of price stability in the medium term, it must decide on an instrument plan such that the corresponding in ‡ation forecast in the medium term, conditional on all relevant information and its instrument plan, falls between the undisclosed lower bound and the upper bound of 2%.
In October 1998, the Eurosystem (ECB 1998a, see also ECB 1999) announced that the monetary policy strategy would consist of "two key elements," later called "the two pillars:" The …rst pillar is "a prominent role for money" with a reference value for M3
growth, set at 4.5% in December 1998 (ECB 1998b). Monetary targeting per se was rejected, however. Instead money's role as an indicator of future in ‡ation was emphasized:
"Deviations of current monetary growth from the reference value would, under normal circumstances, signal risks to price stability." The reference value was reconsidered in December 1999 and maintained at 4.5%. The second pillar is a "broadly-based assessment of the outlook for price developments and the risks to price stability," where the assessment is made "using a wide range of economic and …nancial variables as indicators for future price developments."
From the above discussion, it is clear that the …rst pillar is redundant. Only the second pillar is needed, if interpreted as a conditional forecast, taking into account all relevant information, including that in monetary aggregates. There seem to be no rational reason for giving a certain set of indicators of future in ‡ation the status of a separate "pillar"
(rather than one of the bricks in one main pillar). This instead makes the framework inconsistent and ambiguous, as several observers have noted. In contrast, when the Swiss National Bank (1999) in December 1999 announced that it would abandon monetary targeting, it simply made clear that " [m] onetary policy decisions will be based mainly on an in ‡ation forecast, which will take all relevant indicators into account."
III. Communication
In ‡ation-targeting central banks make considerable e¤ort to explaining past outcomes and motivate current policy decisions, typically with reference to published conditional in‡ation forecasts. For instance, Sveriges Riksbank organizes its quarterly In ‡ation Report (see, e.g., Sveriges Riksbank, 1999) according to its view of the transmission mechanism and the determination of in ‡ation; it also systematically updates its estimates of the main determinants of in ‡ation and summarizes the resulting adjustments in its conditional in‡ation forecast relative to that reported in the previous In ‡ation Report. The degree of uncertainty in the forecast is also updated and assessed in each Report. 
IV. Actual Instrument Decisions
The Eurosystem's main instrument is its "main re…nancing rate," a short repurchase rate. On December 22, 1998, the Eurosystem announced that it would set an initial rate of 3%. On April 8, 1999, the rate was lowered to 2.5%. On November 4, the rate was increased to 3%. Were these decisions appropriate, given the goals of the Eurosystem and the information available at the times of decision?
Did the Eurosystem take its controversial …rst pillar into account? Between October 1998 and October 1999, the 3-month moving average of 12-month M3 growth rates ‡uc-tuated between 4.7% and 6.0%. At the time of the decision in April, the 3-month moving average of the 12-month M3 growth through February was 5.1%, well above the reference value of 4.5% (the money-growth rate is published with about 4 weeks lag). Presumably, this should have motivated an increase rather than a decrease of the interest rate. During
March-September, the moving average rose steadily to 5.9%, motivating an increase, but not necessarily as late as November. Obviously, the …rst pillar has been disregarded at the Eurosystem's discretion-hardly surprising, given its redundancy.
Instrument decisions should ideally be evaluated ex ante, given the information available to the Eurosystem at the time of the decisions. The crucial information would include the Eurosystem's internal conditional in ‡ation forecasts during the period, for instance, the conditional in ‡ation forecasts for 3% and 2.5% interest rates in April and November, respectively. Since the Eurosystem has declined to make this information available and to allow outside scrutiny of its forecasts, it is not possible to decide with any precision whether the decisions were appropriate. Using external forecasts is problematic, since the assumptions of external forecasters about Eurosystem monetary policy need to be sorted out. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that external forecasts, as reported in the December 1999 Monthly Bulletin (and apparently also internal forecasts, see above) point to average in ‡ation of 1.5% in 2000 and 2001.
Because of the transmission lags in monetary policy, it is too early for any ex post evaluation of Eurosystem decisions. Another year or two will be needed for that. Since actual outcomes are contaminated by shocks occurring after instrument decisions, or unknown at the time of decisions, ex post evaluation is far from straightforward. Missing the target range is not necessarily evidence of a mistake, and meeting it is not necessarily evidence of good decisions.
V. Conclusions
The …rst year of the Eurosystem has seen a successful launch of the Euro and an apparently successful introduction of the common monetary policy. The Eurosystem monetary strategy is quite similar to ‡exible in ‡ation targeting, for instance, in having a quantitative de…nition of price stability, in the emphasis on the medium term, and in the concern to avoid real instability. Eventual publication of internal forecasts would increase this similarity. There seem to be no fatal mistakes in either design or instrument setting.
Still, there is considerable room for improvement with regard to internal consistency and transparency of the regime.
The remaining asymmetry and ambiguity in the de…nition of price stability, although minor, does not serve any useful purpose. The insistence on the separate …rst pillar is an important source of ambiguity and inconsistency. The …rst pillar is redundant (as also indicated by the …rst year's experience 1 A more detailed discussion of the Eurosystem is given in Svensson (1999b) . In ‡ation targeting is discussed in Bernanke et al (1999) and Svensson (1997 Svensson ( , 1999a .
2 The Eurosystem's "below 2%" is reminiscent of the brief period when the previous Chancellor of Exchequer speci…ed Bank England's in ‡ation target as the ambiguous "2.5%
or less," leaving open the interpretation of "or less." The current Chancellor wisely removed the "or less."
